IDF har endret sin "rule of engagement" under pågående kampanje på Vestbredden.
Så sier kommentator Yagil Levy i Haaretz 17. oktober 2022:
"In the West Bank, the Israeli Army Is Losing the Little Restraint It Had"
Resultatet er langt flere drepte palestinere enn under lignende omstendigheter i tidligere år.
Tankevekkende artikkel, Israel har erstattet diplomati med vold.
Skudeneshavn 18. oktober 2022
Jan Marton Jensen
På Twitter:
18. oktober 2022
https://twitter.com/janmarton/status/1582294848773971969
22. oktober 2022
https://twitter.com/janmarton/status/1583750811699785730
Kilde:
HELE artikkelen i Haaretz 17. oktober 2022:
In
late March, following a series of terror attacks, Israel's policing
army launched Operation Breaking the Wave, in the course of which it
raided Palestinian cities to arrest and kill terror suspects. According
to UN reports, from the operation’s inception to the end of September,
Israel killed 74 Palestinians in the West Bank.
So that we don’t take such death tolls for granted, it would be proper
to compare them to Operation Critical Time (“Godel Hasha’a”), when from
October 2015 through March 2016, the army operated to suppress the “lone wolf Intifada” – attacks by Palestinians not officially affiliated with any organization—against Israelis in the summer of 2015.
Like the current pattern, the army’s first response was offensive: Raids in areas where the attacks originated. But the commander of the Judea & Samaria Regional Brigade, Brig. Gen. Lior Carmeli, declared it a failure “so palpable, that we decided to halt this offensive action within a few days.”
The army realized that its methods are unsuited to deal with unorganized attacks, and according to Carmeli, deduced that “[Palestinian] casualties from the clashes are the main fuel for their continued intensification. Avoiding this is one of the most significant lessons from previous uprisings.”
Therefore, a restrained 'rules of engagement' policy was devised. Major
General Roni Numa the head of IDF Central Command at the time boasted
that “In the effort of deploying the tactical force, the combat
trooper’s ability to neutralize an assailant without killing…. so as to
reduce the number of funerals that turn into public displays of
sympathy…”
This policy was supported by Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, who preached
restraint, although he says most ministers pushed for a tough response,
but were contained by then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense
Minister Moshe Yaalon. Eventually, a third Intifada was averted. This does not mean that the military brass were peaceniks, but they understood the limitations of force.
Nothing is left of this restrained approach. Under the shock of the Azaria affair,
the military itself began to revel in the numbers of casualties. When
Aviv Kochavi replaced Eisenkot as IDF Chief of Staff he echoed this
trend through the terminology of “lethality” and in turning the body
count into a measure of success.
The increased right-wing influence on the government following Netanyahu's removal, and the criticism of so-called “abandonment” of the soldiers, brought about a loosening of the rules of engagement by late 2021, when firing on Palestinians throwing rocks and incendiary devices was permitted even after they had released their projectile.
More captive to the settlers than ever before, Israel's policing army has yielded to their increased violence toward the Palestinians. The wisdom of restraint has evaporated. An indication of the trigger-happiness can be gleaned from B’tselem reports, which are based in part on IDF Spokesperson’s Office official reports and which present the circumstances of each casualty.
Let a single indication suffice, pertaining to the killing of rock throwers (excluding cases in which the army claims that the deceased used other means of assault as well) – i.e., cases in which the soldiers could have reacted without killing.
Out of 142 casualties in the 2015-2016 operation, 7 were shot after throwing rocks, or some 5 percent. In “Breaking the Wave” it’s 9 of the 47 cases reported by B’tselem until the end of July, or some 20 percent. Under such circumstances, the odds increase of the clashes expanding into a broad and bloody operation, and perhaps the collapse of the Palestinian Authority.
The conduct of the military strengthens the conclusion that perhaps the difference between the two cases is not only the leadership but also the agenda, which seeks piecemeal annexation of the West Bank, starting with Area C, while rejecting the option of renewing talks. This is the most likely interpretation for the combination of proactive violence, which the Israeli leadership should know the likely outcome of, along with diplomatic paralysis.
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