13. februar 2023 i Aljazeera: "Sudan: Burhan dismisses sanctions threats, lauds ties with Israel" "Military leader says intelligence sharing between Tel Aviv and Khartoum helped arrest suspected fighters in Sudan."
Utdrag: "He also lauded ties with Israel, saying intelligence sharing between
the two former adversaries helped arrest suspected fighters in his
country.
Protesters have been on the streets for months since Burhan led a
military coup in October last year that ended a civilian-military
partnership that was meant to lead to democratic elections, a move that
was also widely condemned by the international community.
US officials have said they are looking into options to respond to
the killing of at least 79 protesters, according to a toll by medics,
and to moves to impede civilian-led government".
9. februar 2023 i Aljazeera: "Russia’s Lavrov visits Sudan on diplomatic push in Africa’s Sahel" "Lavrov arrived in Khartoum seeking to bolster the two countries’ economic ties, especially in infrastructure."
Al-Fattah berømmer sikkerhetssamarbeidet med Israel. Rimeligvis betyr dette tilgang til overvåking av Al-Fattah's motstandere.
En både tankevekkende ... og oppsiktsvekkende ... artikkel i Haaretz om Israels kontakt med makthaverne i Sudan.:
"First Saudi Arabia, Now Sudan: Why Israel's Normalization Strategy Is Imploding"
"One
size doesn't fit all. Triumphal bombast may suit normalization with the
UAE, but it won't work with Saudi Arabia, Djibouti or Iraq. With Sudan,
Israel's hubris and complicity with the coup may well blow up in its
face." (Haaretz 4. november 2021, se HELE artikkelen under Kilde)
..........................
Artikelforfatteren skriver altså:
"With Sudan,
Israel's hubris and complicity with the coup may well blow up in its
face."
Her skrives det rett ut at Israel har medvirket til kuppet i Sudan.
DA har Israels søken etter støtte i autoritære og antidemokratiske regimer i området blitt en farlig politikk ... og det langt ut over de okkuperte palestinske områder.
First Saudi Arabia, Now Sudan: Why Israel's Normalization Strategy Is Imploding
Yonatan TouvalNovember 04, 2021
Sudan's
Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, then head of the transitional military council
and now coup leader, meets Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince on a visit to the UAE two years agoMohamed Al
Hammadi/Ministry of Presidential Affairs via AP
One year and two days after the celebratory announcement that Sudan
and Israel had agreed to normalize relations, Jerusalem finds itself
facing a strategic dilemma in the wake of the Sudanese military's power
grab in Khartoum.
Suspicion that Israeli officials were in the know about the plot, if
not outright complicit in it, surfaced almost immediately following a
report reports that a Sudanese security delegation had secretly visited Israel
just weeks earlier. And this suspicion seemed all but validated in
light of the revelation that an Israeli delegation, which included
defense and Mossad representatives, traveled to Khartoum in the aftermath of the coup for talks on unspecified topics.
While it is not known who headed the Israeli side on both these
occasions, it appears that on the Sudanese side it was Mohamed Hamdan
Dagalo, the notorious commander
of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and a key ally of General
Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the man
responsible for the putsch.
Unfortunately, even if there are no grounds to believe that Israeli
military and intelligence officials were complicit in the military
takeover (a possibility about which even some Israeli journalists have openly speculated), Israel is far from an innocent bystander.
Israel is a stakeholder
with vested interests, formally bound up in Sudan's political
transition in light of the Trump administration's ill-witted decision
last year to force Khartoum to agree to normalize relations with
Jerusalem in exchange for a package of vital financial incentives,
including Sudan’s long-awaited removal from U.S. list of State Sponsors
of Terrorism.
Then-President
Donald Trump talks on a phone call in the Oval Office with the leaders
of Sudan and Israel as his advisors and officials applaudAP Photo/Alex
Brandon
It was a role in a quid pro quo that Israel should have refused to play, and precisely because of its genuinely strategic interests in forging a long-term relationship
with a stable and functioning Sudan. Indeed, as some analysts,
including myself, had warned ahead of the announcement of the deal, the
heavy-handed manner in which Washington pressured Khartoum to normalize
relations with Jerusalem was bound to backfire.
At a time that Sudan
was governed by a fragile cohabitation arrangement between military and
civilian stakeholders and undergoing a fragile process of
democratization, we argued, a decision as publicly contentious as
recognizing Israel risked strengthening the very elements who posed the
greatest impediment to a smooth transition to civilian rule – primarily,
the military, which assumed the lead in establishing contacts with
Israel, and the Islamists, who opposed any such contacts.
In the event, Israeli prime minister at the time, Benjamin Netanyahu,
put aside Israel's long-term interests in favor of a short-term public
relations victory in the form of yet another normalization deal with a
Muslim country. In so doing, he joined President Trump’s desire to score
a quick victory for expedient political gains – just two weeks before
the U.S. presidential elections.
The risk that such a move would add further friction to Sudan's
internal political process – a process whose derailment would not only
doom the country's chances of transitioning into a Western-oriented
democracy but throw it into a prolonged political turmoil and perhaps
even civil war – was blithely ignored. Sudan, after all, was a trophy,
not a partner.
To be sure, turmoil in Sudan would first and foremost constitute a
tragedy for the people of Sudan. But as Netanyahu must have appreciated,
it would also undermine Israel's broader strategic goals.
Absenting a functioning government, Sudan would be in no position to
partner and collaborate with Israel on any number of issues, including
strategic-related interests pertaining, most urgently, to Iranian
regional actions directly and through its proxies – both inside Sudan
and the Red Sea. And it is these very interests that appear to have
guided Israel’s most recent moves against the backdrop of the military
takeover in Sudan.
A
Sudanese protester draped with the national flag flashes the victory
sign next to burning tires in the capital Khartoum to denounce overnight
detentions by the army of members of Sudan's government- - AFP
Certainly, from a narrowly-defined security perspective, Israel is
right to be seeking assurances from Sudan’s military leadership that any
preliminary understandings over security and intelligence cooperation,
reached before the coup, would be upheld.
Thus, for instance, of utmost concern to Israel is that the establishment of an intelligence base
on the Red Sea, presumably near the Sudan's principal coastal city of
Port Said, not be imperiled, not least given the recent unrest in the
area that had seen tribal protesters blockading the seaport for several
weeks.
All the same, even as it is too early to tell how the military coup
in Sudan will play out, Jerusalem’s recent actions suggest it has no
actual thought-out policy toward Khartoum. Israel-Sudan relations
require a broader and more nuanced view, especially as the new military
leadership has failed to win legitimacy from Washington and other key
Western powers.
Indeed, the strong condemnation by the Biden administration, which
has already suspended $700 million in financial assistance to Sudan,
should cast a chill on Israel’s rapprochement with the Sudanese
leadership rather than, as Jerusalem seems determined to show, stimulate
it.
The very fact that Israeli officials have confirmed the report about
the visit of the Israeli delegation to Khartoum last week – a report
that originally appeared in a Sudanese newspaper and which Israeli
officials might have easily dismissed, refused to comment on, and even
ban its publication in Israel – suggests that there are those in
Jerusalem who deem it useful to demonstrate that Israel is defying
the consensus among its allies on how to respond to the putsch in
Sudan, perhaps as a way of rewarding the Sudanese military leadership
for their willingness to continue to cooperate with Israel on vital
security needs.
Sudanese
Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok holds a press conference at the Council
of Ministers in the capital Khartoum this summer before being deposed in
a military coupASHRAF SHAZLY - AFP
And the possibility that Israeli actions have, at the very least, been coordinated
with Washington only underscores the apparent utility in this defiance –
namely, that Israel is determined to tread its own course and is
willing to prove useful for its allies should they so desire.
Either way, Israel's conduct betrays misguided diplomatic and strategic thinking.
It's misguided, in that it feeds into Sudanese misconceptions about
Jerusalem’s sway over Washington (misconceptions, often tinged with
antisemitism, that are prevalent not only in the Arab and Muslim world
but also in many European capitals). And misguided, in that it fails to
read the regional and international map.
In contrast to the global acquiescence to the counter-revolutionary coup in Egypt that toppled the government of Mohammed Morsi,
Western powers are unlikely to accept the counter-revolutionary putsch
in Khartoum. It is one thing to overthrow an Islamist leadership, even
if it was democratically elected; it is another thing altogether to
derail a political process that holds out the promise of a
Western-oriented democracy.
Rather than let narrow security interests combined with diplomatic
hubris drive its policy toward Khartoum, therefore, Israel and its
relatively new government have an opportunity to rethink its approach to
Sudan. Such an approach, which might be called differential
normalization, might also help inform and refashion its outlook toward
diplomatic opportunities such as brokering ties with further former
adversaries more broadly.
Women
in Khartoum chant slogans to protest Sudanese President of the
Sovereignty Council Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan's contentious
decision to meet Israel's prime minister in a move toward normaliP
Photo/Marwan Ali
With respect to Sudan, Israel should curb its instincts and proceed
cautiously, limiting its relations with the military leadership only to
the most vital security and intelligence needs.
Israel must recall that what incentivized the Sudanese military
stakeholders – first and foremost, General al-Burhan, the most
conspicuous backer of the normalization agreement with Israel within the
Sudanese leadership – was the generous financial package that was
offered in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel. Now that key
elements in the package are in jeopardy, it remains to be seen whether,
and for how long, the generals will continue to embrace Israel.
And although al-Burhan continues to enjoy considerable support,
including also financial, from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, their money can
never entirely supplant the kind of aid that Sudan would need from the
World Bank, IMF, and other international institutions.
The very need for Israel to adopt a more cautious and nuanced
approach to Sudan applies also to other regional players. The gung-ho
enthusiasm Jerusalem conveyed toward the first signatories of the
so-called Abraham Accords last year, the UAE and Bahrain,
and, at least in the case of the UAE, its reciprocity, set a standard
that was difficult and perhaps impossible to reach for others.
Indeed, it is no wonder that, despite the expectations that as many as nine countries
might follow the example of the UAE and Bahrain and normalize relations
with Israel, only one single country in addition to Sudan did so –
namely, Morocco, which took the step in return for winning American recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.
Sudanese
anti-coup protesters gather in a street in the capital Khartoum olast
month to express their support for the country's democratic transition,
derailed by a military coup and deadly crackdown- - AFP
While the reluctance of others to join, notably Oman
and Saudi Arabia, may have also had to do with a wide array of
considerations, including the expectation of a change in administrations
in Washington, Israel’s ham-fisted approach played a factor.
The way in which Israel bungled the direct face-to-face talks at a meeting between then-prime minister Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
in Neom last November is a case in point. The Israeli public's
swaggering bombast over the meeting, which was supposed to remain
undisclosed, generated considerable backlash from opponents of
normalization with Israel from within the Saudi royal household and
quashed whatever existed for a diplomatic breakthrough during the final
weeks of the Trump administration.
Having instantly established a uniform model for how normalization
should look and feel, Israel is losing opportunities to make diplomatic
advances with countries that might have been put off by the triumphalist
terms and adulatory tones in which Israel’s accords with the UAE and
Bahrain were cast. After all, no country is like another, and no
relationship can, or indeed should, be like another. What suits the UAE
and, with some adjustments, Bahrain, does not and cannot suit Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Djibouti.
Yet Israel’s one-size-fits-all approach did not originate with the
Abraham Accords. It has shaped its attitude to allies and rivals alike
since at least the 1979 signing of its peace treaty with Egypt. Indeed,
it explains why Israel is so resentful of the cold peace with Egypt and impatient with the standoffish attitude of Jordan.
A
woman walks in front of a banner in Dammam showing Saudi King Salman,
right, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, left, and Saudi Arabia's
founder late King Abdul Aziz Al Saud AP Photo/Amr Nabil
In Israel’s black-and-white diplomatic imagination, peace must
translate into a warm and thriving relationship, with trade and tourism
at their heart; anything that falls short of that feels like a snub.
It is this same attitude that hampered efforts to reach a peace
agreement with Syria, especially during the final days of Hafez al Assad
in 2000, when Israel’s demands for a full-blown peace deterred the
ailing leader out of concern that his son and apparent successor,
Bashar, would be unable to overcome the domestic opposition which the
influx of Israeli goods and tourists was expected to generate.
Unfortunately, his preference for a "go-slow" approach was taken by
then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak as a sign that Assad was not serious
enough.
Finally, a policy of differential normalization might also help
Israel overcome some of its ingrained resistance to making meaningful
progress with the Palestinians.
Israel’s seemingly countless demands on the Palestinians at the level
of their attitude to Israel – whether that they recognize Israel as a
"Jewish state" or abandon their myth of the Right of Return – all
bespeak the same intrinsic difficulty to fathom a peace agreement,
especially one that required making supposedly painful concessions, that
did not reflect amity and reconciliation. It is yet one more reason why
Israel has failed to do all that it might have done to reach a
final-status agreement with the PLO and, mutatis mutandis, a long-term hudna, or truce, with Hamas.
A policy of differential normalization would not only open up a world
of possibilities for Israel that, as yet, remain inconceivable. And it
will help Israel make peace with the peace that it has already won.
Yonatan Touval is a senior foreign policy analyst at Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. Twitter: @Yonatan_Touval
Det var håp mht utviklingen mot demokrati i Sudan.
Det sivile samfunn hadde stått opp så samlet mor militærdiktaturet at Sudans militære gikk med på et overgangstyre.
Men nå når det nærmet seg ... det var snakk om bare dager ... til de sivile lederne skulle overta ... da gikk Sudans militære leder al-Burhan til aksjon.
- Regjeringsjefen og andre ledende sivile ble satt i arrest midt på natten.
- Sudans militære hadde overtatt kontrollen i landet.
Det har ligget latent at dette kunne skje.
Militære ledere gir ikke uten videre fra seg makt.
Nå må det settes eksta søkelys på de land Sudans militære har søkt støtte hos ... både politisk og kanskje også pengemessig.
Og da peker pilene på Egypt og UAE.
Dette er land som har autoritær ledelse som er kjent for å ha ambisjoner i regionen ..ref deres støtte til opprørere i Libya.
Norge må være aktiv i denne saken i UNSC.
Der må det bl.a graves dypere i ... og eksponeres ... hva nabolandene til Sudan bidrar med.
For Sudan var kanskje håpet som brast mht utvikling til et demokrati.
Tegningen blir klarere og klarere.
Saudi-Arabia ... med følgere ... både i Midtøsten og i USA ... jobber systematisk MOT demokratiske bevegelser i nabolandene og i Nord-Afrika.
Saudi-Arabia er fra før et av de mest undertrykkende regimer i verden.
Man slå knallhart ned på kritikk i EGET land ... og VERRE er det blitt etter at kronprins Mohammad bin Salman slapp til.
Men også i ANDRE land har Saudi-Arabia en agenda ... og de har penger og våpen å dele.
Det er nå klart at både i Libya og Sudan har de militære maktstreberne der besøkt Saudi-Arabia.
Og det er ETTER slike besøk at krigsherrene Haftar i Libya og Hemedti i Sudan har gått til brutale våpenangrep på demokratibevegelser og sivile i de respektive land.
Fra før av har Saudi-Arabia hatt et stort ansvar i Syria ... våpen- og pengestøtte til militante sunni-ekstremister.
Og landet fører en grusom krig i Yemen.
Det verste er at landet støttes av USA ... iallefall av Trump og hans svigersønn Kushner.
Det blir mer og mer klart at det er Saudi-Arabias PENGER disse er ute etter.
Kushner-familiens eiendomsselskap Cadre har fått 90 millioner dollar fra ukjente givere de siste to år:
"Company part-owned by Jared Kushner got $90m from unknown offshore investors since 2017"
(The Guardian 10. juni 2019).
Den negative innflytelse Saudi-Arabia står for må EKSPONERES.
Her er moral og etikk på avveie ... og under aktiv spredning.
Og Det Hvite Hus har abdisert ... Trump har til og med gitt krigsherren Haftyar i Libya støtte i en egen telefonsamtale med ham.
Og Trump-familiens nære bånd til Saudi-Arabia kjenner vi godt til.
Mer fokus er nødvendig.
Avisene må skrive om dette.
Og vår regjering må MENE NOE.
Vi har da en regjeringsjef og en utenriksminister?
Skudeneshavn 10. juni 2019
Jan Marton Jensen
Sent som debatt-innlegg til Dagsavisen 10. juni 2019
Utvalgte sitater fra kilde-artikler:
People have started putting up barricades in many areas and it seems that the situation is aggravating," Hamid Eldood, a professor at Al-Neelain University, told Al Jazeera from Khartoum.
He added that the latest developments indicated a "tone change" by
the members of the TMC following the visit by its head, General Abdel
Fattah al-Burhan, and his deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo - also known as
Hemeti - "to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates".
"It is really a barbaric act and it seems Sudan is heading towards civil war and a [bleak] future," Eldood said. (Aljazeera 3. juni 2019).
Hemeti - the warlord who may control Sudan’s future
According to Al Jazeera, Hemeti went to meet Saudi Arabia's crown prince Mohamed Bin Salman earlier in May,
promising to support the country against "all threats and attacks from
Iran and Houthi militias" and to continue sending Sudanese troops to
help the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.
It would be in the Saudi prince's interest to return the favour and maintain a strong relationship with Hemeti.
(BBC 5. juni 2019)
The Saudis have to a considerable extent seized and held the diplomatic initiative.
They
and the UAE have pitched in with financial aid for Sudan, including an
immediate injection of cash and transfers of cheap fuel, food and
medicines.
Abu Dhabi has hosted talks among various armed groups about future political arrangements.
And Riyadh's ally, Egypt, has played a role in deploying its diplomatic muscle at the African Union.
(BBC 2. mai 2019)
